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Editorial
Internet Balkanization gathers pace: is privacy the
real driver?
Christopher Kuner*, Fred H. Cate**, Christopher Millard**,
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson***, and Orla Lynskey****
‘[W]e do not really trust the Data Acts in other countries
or . . . we understand that there are none at all. So we feel
unprotected in those countries with our data – walking
down Fifth Avenue in our underwear’.
Provocative exclamations of distrust have become
commonplace in recent skirmishes between the EU and
the USA over data privacy and trade policy. This is,
however, well-trodden ground. Indeed, the statement
above was made in the late 1970s by Kerstin Amer, an
Under Secretary of State in the Swedish Government, as
a justification for the world’s first national data protec-
tion law, a statute which included a requirement that
prior authorization be obtained for exports of personal
data. During the 1970s and early 1980s various other
countries also raised concerns about ‘data sovereignty’.
Not all were European, though several appear to have
been motivated by anxiety about a US hegemony that
was already emerging in cross-border data services. For
example, a 1972 Canadian Federal Government report
entitled Computers and Privacy acknowledged that ‘as a
sovereign state, Canada feels some national embarrass-
ment and resentment over increasing quantities of often
sensitive data about Canadians being stored in a foreign
country’. With the benefit of hindsight, this juxtaposition
of injured sovereignty and privacy concerns looks like an
early example of confused thinking about data export
controls. A few years later, the Brazilian Government
declared its commitment “to maximize the information
resources located in Brazil, declaring that ‘teleprocessing
services provided by means of computers located abroad
are not, in principle, used by Brazil”.’1
In response to such developments, Mr Justice Kirby, then
Chairman of the OECD Expert Group on Transborder
Data Barriers and the Protection of Privacy, warned in
1980 that ‘[t]he bureaucratic nightmare, impossibly cum-
bersome, ineffective, and expensive impediments to inter-
national data traffic could still develop’.2 Since then, a key
stated objective of almost all international initiatives to
promote harmonization of data privacy rules has been to
facilitate the free movement of personal data between
states that make a commitment to enforce certain, more
or less basic, data protection principles. This is true of
non-binding measures, such as the 1980 OECD Guide-
lines, as well as treaties and other binding instruments,
such as the 1981 Council of Europe Convention on data
protection and the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive.
Yet agitation for stronger geographical and jurisdic-
tional restrictions on data flows persists, including
recent calls for transfers to be restricted between entities
that are already subject to legally binding mechanisms to
protect cross-border flows of personal data (such as the
EU-US Safe Harbor). The temperature of the debate has
risen markedly since the Snowden revelations began to
emerge, with suggestions recently that even transfers
within established free-flow regions (such as the EEA)
should be curtailed.
A specific example of an initiative that might lead to
material disruption of cloud and other Internet-based
services is talk in Europe about development of a pos-
sible virtual Schengen area. Although so far rather in-
choate, this appears to be an attempt to create an online
free movement zone for data to operate alongside the
physical Schengen Area within which internal border
controls have already been removed between most EU
and EFTA countries. The idea was first aired in February
2011, not in a data protection context, but during a
discussion of cybercrime at a Joint Meeting of the EU’s
Law Enforcement and Customs Cooperation Working
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1 For a more detailed discussion with further examples of early calls for
localization of data processing operations, see chapter 9 of Christopher
Millard, Legal Protection of Computer Programs and Data (Carswell / Sweet &
Maxwell, Toronto / London, 1985).
2 ‘Data Flows and the Basic Rules of Data Privacy’ (1980) 16 Stan J. Int. L
27–66 at 29.
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Parties. As the minutes attest: ‘The Presidency of the
LEWP presented its intention to propose concrete mea-
sures towards creating a single secure European cyber-
space with a certain “virtual Schengen border” and
“virtual access points” whereby the Internet Service Pro-
viders (ISP) would block illicit contents on the basis of
the EU “black-list”’. The idea was revived in August 2013
when Thierry Breton of EU cloud provider Atos (and
France’s former Minister of Economy, Finance and In-
dustry) proposed ‘a kind of Schengen for data’.3 It is far
from clear what this might mean in practice. For
example, what would be the status of the two major EU
countries that are outside the existing Schengen Area?
One, the UK, is the main centre of gravity for financial
services in Europe; the other, Ireland, hosts a substantial
proportion of Europe’s cloud computing infrastructure.
Initiatives in some individual EU member states have
gone even further, with Deutsche Telekom announcing
in October 2013 that it planned to build a German-only
‘Internetz’ to keep German Internet traffic within Ger-
many’s physical borders.4 Meanwhile, the war of words
between the EU and USA over systematic mass surveil-
lance has provided fertile ground for states like Russia to
argue that they too can no longer trust their citizens’
data to invasive foreign regimes. In terms rather reminis-
cent of the quote from Kerstin Amer that opened this
Editorial, Russian MP Vadim Dengin is reported to have
justified to the State Duma the mandatory local storage
obligations in Russia’s new data protection law with the
rousing words: ‘Most Russians don’t want their data to
leave Russia for the United States, where it can be hacked
and given to criminals. Our entire lives are stored over
there’.5
Would any of this really enhance privacy protection?
There are serious reasons for doubting that any of the
current initiatives would actually do so. This is largely
because strategies of this type that are supposed to
protect individual rights, in particular by constraining
data location and transfers, continue to be commingled
with motivators based on vague concepts of national
sovereignty and economic advantage. As we have noted
previously, the Snowden revelations of systematic gov-
ernment surveillance have led to soul-searching about
both the relevance of fundamental privacy concepts and
the effectiveness of existing frameworks for ensuring
protection of personal data.6 As with that surveillance
debate, arguments about Internet regionalization and
data localization are often stymied by a fundamental
lack of transparency. Indeed, by mandating storage of
data within their own national boundaries, governments
may hope to gain increased access to such data. Mixed
messages and hypocrisy abound and privacy is increas-
ingly invoked as a justification, or at least used as a
smokescreen, for policies that are incoherent and, in
many cases, far from privacy-enhancing.
What is needed, and what we have not yet seen, is
a detailed and credible explanation by proponents of
data localization as to how such initiatives would enhance
privacy protection, restrain intelligence surveillance, and
generally increase the level of privacy online. Until such
an explanation based on serious legal and computer
science considerations is put forward, it is right to remain
skeptical about the motivations behind data localization
initiatives, and what their results would be.
doi:10.1093/idpl/ipu032
3 ,http://www.europe1.fr/Economie/Breton-creer-une-sorte-de-Schengen-
des-donnees-1620759/. accessed 17 December 2014.
4 ,http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/deutsche-telekom-pushes-
all-german-internet-safe-from-spying-a-933013.html. accessed 17
December 2014.
5 For a discussion of these and other recent ‘Balkanization’ initiatives see
Kuan Hon and others, ‘Policy, Legal and Regulatory Implications of a
Europe-Only Cloud’, available at ,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2527951##. accessed 17 December 2014.
6 See our early Editorial on ‘PRISM and privacy: will this change
everything?’ (2013) 3/4 Int Data Privacy Law. ,http://idpl.oxfordjournals.
org/content/3/4/217.full.pdf+html?sid=b7d189ef-0ab1-4b92-8dd9-
dbaa2b4b024f. accessed 17 December 2014.
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